

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02  
SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13 AID-05 SSM-03 MCT-01 EB-07  
OES-07 /104 W

-----065180 060628Z /16

R 051505Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7054  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 4860

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, IS, US, XF  
SUBJECT:CODEL JAVITS; VIEWS ON THE WEST BANK AND THE PEACE PROCESS

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT A DINNER FOR SENATOR JAVITS, MINISTER  
OF AGRICULTURE SHARON STATED IN BLUNT, FORCEFUL TERMS  
THAT ISRAEL CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK. SECURITY  
CONSIDERATIONS PRECLUDED ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FROM  
RELINQUISHING MILITARY CONTROL OF ANY PART OF THE AREA.  
THE MAIN PROBLEM FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE RENEWED  
TERRORIST INCURSIONS--WHICH OUTSIDE GUARANTEES OR  
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT PREVENT. DMC LEADER  
RUBENSTEIN INSISTED THAT INDEFINITE OCCUPATION WOULD  
NEVER BE TOLERATED; HE THOUGHT U.S. GUARANTEES COULD  
BE RELIED UPON. GENERAL YARIV WOULD HAVE ISRAEL PLACE  
THE PEACE ISSUE BEFORE THE QUESTION OF BORDERS. FOR  
PRESIDENT CARTER'S CONCEPTION OF PEACE, YARIV WOULD  
MAKE FAR-REACHING WITHDRAWALS; BUT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE  
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ARABS WILL AGREE TO THAT KIND OF PEACE. TO QUESTIONS  
ON THE POSSIBLE EROSION OF U.S. SUPPORT AND ARAB  
USE OF THE OIL WEAPON, SHARON SAID SUPPORT OF  
ISRAEL IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST AND THE ENERGY  
PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED AT ISRAEL'S EXPENSE.  
HOWEVER, ISRAEL'S PROXIMITY TO THE SAUDI BORDER  
COULD BE USED TO PRECLUDE A FUTURE EMBARGO.

AFTER ASSERTING THAT BEGIN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE WITH THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR JAVITS SAID THAT THE CHOICE FOR ISRAEL COULD BECOME RETENTION OF THE WEST BANK OR MAINTENANCE OF THE PRESENT LEVEL OF U.S. SUPPORT.  
END SUMMARY

1. I INVITED A SMALL GROUP TO DINNER JULY 3 TO TALK WITH SENATOR JAVITS AND HIS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, ALBERT LAKELAND. PRESENT WERE GENERAL ARIK SHARON, TEL AVIV MAYOR (GEN. RET) SHLOMO LAHAT (BOTH LIKUD MEMBERS), GEN (RET.) SHARON YARIV, AND PROFESSOR AMNON RUBENSTEIN (BOTH OF THE DMC. IT WAS AN INTERESTING MIX OF SUPER-HAWK (SHARON) AND DEDICATED DOVE (RUBENSTEIN) WITH YARIV GAMELY TRYING TO MINIMIZE THE DIFFERENCES. THE EXCHANGES WERE FASCINATING.

2. JAVITS, NOTING THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAD ACCEPTED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WONDERED HOW THE WEST BANK COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM TERRITORIES TO BE YIELDED IN A PEACE SETTLEMENT. SHARON REPLIED, EXPOUNDING AT LENGTH ON THE WEST BANK THROUGH MUCH OF THE CONVERSATION. EMPHASIZING THAT HE SPOKE FOR HIMSELF AND NOT THE GOVERNMENT, HE INSISTED CATEGORICALLY, AND WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION, THAT  
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ISRAEL CANNOT AND WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK. HE SAID NO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD. IN ADDITION TO THE SECURITY ARGUMENT, WHICH TRANSCENDED THE HISTORICAL CLAIM, HE MAINTAINED THAT A THIRD OF ISRAEL'S WATER HAS ITS SOURCES IN THE WEST BANK. ALLUDING TO HIS YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN COMBATING TERRORIST INCURSIONS INTO ISRAEL, HE SAID THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE RENEWED TERRORISM WHICH THIRD PARTY GUARANTEES OR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT PREVENT.

3. SHARON DISMISSED THE ALLON PLAN OR ANY OTHER DIVISION OF THE AREA AS TOTALLY INADEQUATE TO MEET THE THREAT. THE JORDAN VALLEY IS STRATEGICALLY UNIMPORTANT; WHAT MATTERS IS THE CREST OF THE HILLS. HE WOULD NOT ANNEX THE WEST BANK; ITS INHABITANTS COULD REMAIN CITIZENS OF JORDAN OR OF A PALESTINIAN STATE EAST OF THE JORDAN RIVER. FOR SHARON THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WAS SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF MILITARY CONTROL. ISRAEL MUST

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 4860

MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK--NOT  
JUST AT FIXED POINTS; SHE MUST HAVE FREEDOM OF  
MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

4. RUBENSTEIN DISAGREED STRONGLY. INDEFINITE  
MILITARY PRESENCE--REALLY OCCUPATION--WOULD NEVER  
BE TOLERATED. IT IS WORSE THAN OUTRIGHT ANNEXATION  
BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT ALLOW WEST BANKERS POLITICAL  
EXPRESSION. RUBENSTEIN DISSENTED FROM THE VIEW  
THAT U.S. GUARANTEES COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON.  
HE CHALLENGED ANYONE TO CITE AN INSTANCE WHERE  
A NATION WHICH HAD A MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WITH  
THE U.S. HAD BEEN ABANDONED.

5. YARIV SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH SHARON'S ANALYSIS  
OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM, BUT HE WOULD APPROACH THE  
SUBJECT DIFFERENTLY. LET'S START, HE SAID, BY  
POSTULATING THE GOAL OF PEACE. YARIV ACCEPTED  
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COMPLETELY PRESIDENT CARTER'S DEFINITION OF PEACE. FOR THAT KIND OF PEACE HE WAS PREPARED FOR FAR-REACHING TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. HE DOUBTED THAT THE ARABS WOULD, PERHAPS EVEN COULD, ACCEPT FULL PEACE NOW AND UNLESS AND UNTIL THEY DO, YARIV WOULD MAINTAIN THE JORDAN RIVER AS ISRAEL'S SECURITY FRONTIER. HE WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S CONCEPT OF A SECURITY BORDER BEYOND THE POLITICAL. "WE DON'T FULLY AGREE ON THE DETAILS, BUT THIS IS SOMETHING WE COULD NEGOTIATE."

6. YARIV'S DEMAND THAT THE NATURE OF PEACE MUST BE SETTLED FIRST DID NOT SEEM TO BE PUT FORWARD MERELY AS A PLOY. HE SINCERELY HOPED HE WAS WRONG--THAT THE ARABS WOULD, IN FACT, AGREE TO FULL PEACE. IF SO, HE WOULD GLADLY YIELD MOST OF THE TERRITORIES.

7. SHARON INTERJECTED THAT THE U.S. CONCEPTION OF PEACE HAD ERODED (IN APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 27). I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO; THE MONDALE SPEECH REPRESENTED THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ON THAT SUBJECT. THE ELEMENTS OF PEACE REMAINED VITAL IN OUR THINKING.

8. JAVITS SAID HE HOPED SHARON'S VIEWS WERE NOT THE ONES BEGIN WILL PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT. HE THOUGHT BEGIN AND CARTER WILL HAVE COMPATIBLE PERSONALITIES. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT HIS IDEAS ON TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE AND DISCUSS ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS IN THAT CONTEXT--EVEN IF IT MEANT, FOR THE TIME BEING, ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EARS. CONFIDENTIAL

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JAVITS UNDERSTOOD THAT BEGIN WOULD NOT WANT PUBLICLY TO SHOW HIS HAND; HE COULD EXPECT THE PRESIDENT ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC AIRING OF TERRITORIAL ISSUES. JAVITS ASKED WHAT ARE ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS-- A BILATERAL TREATY, MEMBERSHIP IN NATO?

9. SHARON THOUGHT MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WOULD BE BAD FOR ISRAEL. HE REPEATED THAT CONTROL OF THE WHOLE WEST BANK WAS ESSENTIAL TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. LAKELAND NOTED THAT THIS POSITION COULD LEAD TO ANOTHER OIL EMBARGO WHICH WOULD ENTAIL THE THREAT OF COMMUNISTS GAINING POWER IN FRANCE AND ITALY. HE SUGGESTED THAT ADOPTION OF SHARON'S

VIEWS BY ISRAEL COULD UNDERMINE SUPPORT IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE FOR CONTINUING THE HIGH LEVEL OF U.S. ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT ISRAEL HAS ENJOYED IN RECENT YEARS. SHARON REPLIED THAT SUPPORTING ISRAEL IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST. MOREOVER, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD INVITE WAR. I NOTED THE PROBLEM OF ENERGY FOR THE U.S. AND THE FREE WORLD. WITH EMOTION SHARON SAID THAT THE WORLD'S ENERGY PROBLEM HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ISRAEL AND CANNOT BE SOLVED AT ISRAEL'S EXPENSE. HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL COULD HELP. JUST AS KISSINGER SHOULD HAVE DEMANDED AN END TO THE OIL EMBARGO AS THE PRICE FOR SAVING EGYPT'S THIRD ARMY OR ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CANAL'S WEST BANK, SO COULD ISRAEL SEIZE SAUDI TERRITORY AS A HOSTAGE TO STOP ANY FUTURE ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A NEW EMBARGO.

10. JAVITS SAID THAT REALISTICALLY ISRAEL MUST NEGOTIATE WITH THE U.S. BEFORE IT CAN DEAL WITH THE ARABS. IF THE WEST BANK IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ISRAEL, FINE; THAT IS FOR ISRAEL  
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TO DECIDE. BUT THE U.S. MIGHT NOT SUPPORT THAT DECISION. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH THE SENATOR ASSERTING THAT FOR ISRAEL THE CHOICE COULD BECOME RETENTION OF THE WEST BANK OR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF INTIMACY AND SUPPORT.

11. COMMENT: THE CONTENT OF SHARON'S VIEWS WAS LESS SURPRISING (HE HAS SHARED THESE IDEAS WITH EMBOFFS ON SEVERAL RECENT OCCASIONS) THAN THE BLUNTNESS WITH WHICH HE PRESENTED THEM TO THE SENATOR. HE CLAIMS TO BE A MINORITY OF ONE IN THE CABINET. NONETHELESS, IN AN ASIDE RUBENSTEIN TOLD US SHARON'S IDEAS ARE ONE REASON HE COULD "NEVER JOIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT."  
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